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The Balanced Budget Amendment: 




At the heart of the balanced budget debate is a disagreement over economic policy.  
Many economists believe that fiscal policy (increasing spending and/or cutting taxes to promote 
growth in the private economy or decreasing spending and/or raising taxes to mollify inflationary 
pressures) is an important tool for promoting the nation’s economic goals.  Others believe that 
fiscal policy either cannot or should not be employed to promote economic growth.  I am a 
constitutional law professor, not an economist.  As such, I have no special expertise to offer on 
this dispute and, in fact, take no position on which economic school of thought has the better of 
the argument. 
Over the last few years, there have been renewed calls not only to resolve this policy 
dispute, but to place its resolution effectively beyond question or revision by amending the 
Constitution to require a balanced budget.
1
  This suggestion raises constitutional questions of the 
highest order.  Below, I offer my analysis of these questions and the extremely serious threats 
that a balanced budget amendment would pose for our constitutional order. 
I. The Balanced Budget Amendment Contradicts Our Constitutional Design 
The Constitution does not bind the nation or future generations to adhere to any particular 
conception of the public good or of appropriate social or economic policy.  Rather, the 
Constitution recognizes that our vast nation will encompass groups and individuals with starkly 
contrasting and sharply conflicting notions of the public good and sound policy.  Instead of 
trying to resolve these disagreements, the Constitution focuses on structuring governmental 
power and establishing decision-making processes that will promote deliberation and public-
interested measures over oppressive or special-interested ones. 
Our foundational law goes on to supplement these procedural and structural protections 
by enshrining individual rights.  Together these structures and rights allow us to resolve policy 
disagreements in a manner that we all can agree is fair, even if we disagree with specific 
outcomes.  It is precisely because of this basic design that we regard ourselves as a free and self-
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1
 The leading proposals to amend the Constitution refer to the provision as a “balanced budget amendment” and 
virtually all public rhetoric employs this phrase.  For this reason, I adopt it as well to refer to the proposals 
collectively, even though the phrase is an inaccurate expression of what the amendment would require.  The so-
called balanced budget amendment would forbid federal spending to exceed federal revenues for any fiscal year.  
Thus, the amendment would forbid the federal government to run a deficit. The amendment, however, would not 
require that expenditures equal revenues.  The amendment thus would not forbid the federal government to run a 
surplus, and thereby to employ fiscal policy as a means of contracting economic activity in order, for example, to 
restrain inflation. 
2 




It is no accident that our Constitution does not dictate outcomes.  The founding 
generation faced divisive controversies that were every bit as momentous as the present-day 
budget crisis.  Yet they consciously designed the Constitution not to resolve these issues, instead 
leaving them to be resolved through the constitutionally ordained process of legislation in 
accordance with constitutionally guaranteed individual rights.  For example, the founding 
generation was deeply divided over whether to allow the federal government to establish and 
maintain a standing army.
3
  Rather than resolving this issue, the Constitution authorized 
Congress to provide and maintain an army and navy, and designated the President as commander 
in chief, without requiring that Congress deploy this power and establish a standing military 
force.
4
  Thus, the first Congress could decide whether to create a standing army and subsequent 
Congresses, and subsequent generations, could decide for themselves whether to follow suit. 
There was broad public agreement at the time of the Constitution’s adoption regarding 
the need to provide for a judicial power and a Supreme Court to exercise that power.  There was 
no consensus regarding the need for, much less the structure and powers of, a system of lower 




One final example, not from the period of the Constitution’s original ratification, is the 
controversy over the adoption of a federal income tax.  In 1895, the Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution as originally ratified did not allow the federal government to impose an income tax.
6
  
The Constitution was amended not to establish an income tax, but to authorize the federal 
government to create one.
7
  As a result, Congress remains free to abolish the income tax if it 
chooses to do so.  When the public determined in the late-nineteenth century that the best way to 
                                                 
2
 See TOM GINSBURG & ROSALIND DIXON, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2011). 
3
 Compare George Washington, Sentiments of a Peace Establishment (May 2, 1783), reprinted in 3 PHILIP 
KURLAND, THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 128 (1987) (favoring a standing military force) and Alexander 
Hamilton, id. at 130 (same) with Richard Henry Lee, Letter to James Monroe (Jan. 5, 1784), reprinted in id. at 131 
(opposing the establishment of a standing army), Federal Farmer No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in id. at 132 
(same), and A Democratic Federalist (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in id. at 133 (same).  The records of the drafting 
convention show that the delegates held conflicting views on the subject.  See id. at 132.     
4
 See U.S. CONST. art I, sec. 8, cl. 12; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  In advocating for the ratification of the 
Constitution, Alexander Hamilton urged the public to recognize that the Constitution would neither require nor 
forbid the establishment of a standing army, but would leave the matter in the discretion of Congress, which could 
then exercise its judgment as circumstances might dictate.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (Alexander Hamilton). 
5
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (authorizing Congress to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court’); 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).  At the drafting convention, for 
example, John Rutledge moved to strike from the initial draft of the Constitution the provision establishing lower 
federal courts on the ground that this function should be left to state courts.  After Rutledge’s motion passed, James 
Madison and James Wilson moved to authorize Congress to create lower federal tribunals.  “They observed that 
there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to 
establish or not establish them.”  This motion passed overwhelmingly.  See Records of the Federal Convention (June 
5, 1787), reprinted in 3 PHILIP KURLAND, THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 61 (1987). 
6
 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
7
 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes ….”). 
3 
raise revenue for the federal government was through an income tax, they did not impose that 
judgment in the Constitution, but left ensuing generations free to select for themselves the most 
appropriate means of raising federal revenue. 
There is one counter example, but it ultimately reinforces the general constitutional 
design outlined above.  Effective in 1920, the Constitution was amended to prohibit “the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors” in the United States.8  The 
amendment clearly did not involve the structure of governmental power or the processes of 
governmental decisionmaking, nor did it protect an individual right.  Rather, it sought to enshrine 
in the Constitution a resolution of general social policy.  Such a failure was this deviation from 
the Constitution’s design that it stands as the only amendment ever to be repealed.9  The 
repealing amendment is instructive in this regard.  It does not, so to speak, prohibit prohibition.  
Rather, it leaves the question of whether to permit the sale and possession of alcoholic beverages 




It may seem that these observations about the Constitution’s design operate at too high a 
level of abstraction to have any practical relevance to the debate over the balanced budget 
amendment.  These concerns, however, play out in very practical ways that raise insuperable 
objections to the proposed amendment.  In particular, the Framers understood fully well that 
attempts to define and resolve disputes in the Constitution itself would render the Constitution a 
charter of useless “parchment barriers” that could not be enforced.11  This concern informs the 
following analysis of the balanced budget amendment.
12
 
II. The Disastrous Consequences of Enforcing the Proposed Amendment 
The proposed balanced budget amendment provides no express enforcement 
mechanism.
13
  The leading proposals simply declare that total outlays shall not exceed total 
receipts, without explaining how this balanced budget is to be achieved.  Merely imposing a 
mandate does not mean Congress will be able to fulfill it.  One Member of Congress might vote 
to raise taxes, another to reduce entitlement benefits, a third to cut military spending, and a 
fourth to adopt a combination of each.  No single measure may gain a majority in the House or 
Senate, with each individual legislator honestly claiming to have fulfilled the new constitutional 
                                                 
8
 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
9
See OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 247 (Kermit Hall ed., 1992).  To be 
sure, some amendments, such as those dealing with the process of presidential succession, have been refined and 
improved by successive amendments.  Nonetheless, the Prohibition amendment stands as the only amendment 
actually to have been repudiated.   
10
 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
11
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
12
 In referring to the balanced budget amendment, I refer principally to H.J. Res. 2, which I understand to be the 
version that Congress is presently focused on.  The problems with H.J. Res. 2, however, inhere in the very concept 
of a balanced budget amendment, and so apply to varying degrees to any proposal to adopt such a constitutional 
amendment. 
13
 I use the term “enforcement mechanism,” as distinguished from an “enforcement clause.” While some balanced 
budget amendment proposals do include clauses providing that Congress shall enforce the amendment through 
appropriate legislation, they do not articulate how the amendment would be implemented and, rather, leave the 
matter to future legislation and/or judicial decision.  
4 
duty to support a budget that is balanced. 
It is also possible for Congress and the President to fully comply with their constitutional 
obligations and nevertheless enact outlays in excess of receipts.  Congressional budgeting 
depends on forecasting of both receipts and outlays.  If these forecasts turn out to be in error – 
for example, because a subsequent economic downturn substantially reduces government 
receipts and significantly increases outlays due to a greater than foreseen number of individuals 
becoming eligible for various forms of government assistance – then the federal budget enacted 
it would be out of balance even though it appeared to be balanced when Congress and the 
President. 
The omission of an enforcement mechanism is not likely an oversight, as this same 
problem plagued the last several significant efforts to ratify a balanced budget amendment.
14
  
This problem, moreover, is insurmountable.  Every conceivable enforcement mechanism would 
do serious violence to the fundamental structure of our government and of our Constitution. 
There is little doubt that the sponsors of the amendment intend for it to be an enforceable 
legal requirement.  In advocating the amendment’s ratification, sponsors repeatedly speak of 
what the amendment would require or mandate.  For example, Senator Orrin Hatch, the 
measure’s principal sponsor in the Senate, states that a balanced budget amendment “is the only 
way to force Washington to act.”15  Senator Mike Lee asserts that “a balanced-budget 
requirement will ensure we do not continue to drive our country further into debt ….”16  
Representative Bob Goodlatte introduced the measure in the House, declaring “Mr. Speaker, I 
rise to re-introduce legislation that will amend the United States Constitution to force Congress 
to rein in spending by balancing the federal budget.… Unless Congress is forced to make the 
decisions necessary to create a balanced budget, it will always have the all-too-tempting option 
of shirking this responsibility.  A Constitutional balanced budget requirement … will set our 
nation’s fiscal policies on the right path.  This is a common sense approach to ensure that 
Congress is bound by the same fiscal principles that guide America’s families each day”17 
In the absence of an express enforcement mechanism, this role will fall to the judiciary 
and so I will focus on this prospect.  After examining the consequences of assigning this power 
to the judiciary, I will consider alternative enforcement mechanisms. 
A. The Perils of Judicial Enforcement 
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 Robert H. Bork, On Constitutional Economics, AM. ENT. INST. J. ON GOV'T AND SOC'Y 14, 18 (1983), reprinted in 
Proposed Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and 
Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1989) 645, 649; The Balanced Budget 
Amendment: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Walter E. Dellinger), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/jtecon.95.8.htm#N_26_. 
15
 See Orrin Hatch, Balanced Budget Amendment Needed to Fix National Debt Crisis, U.S. NEWS, Apr. 25, 2011 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/04/25/balanced-budget-amendment-
needed-to-fix-national-debt-crisis. 
16
 Mike Lee, Why We Need a Balanced Budget Amendment, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2011 (emphasis added), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/03/AR2011030304714.html. 
17
 See Balanced Budget Amendment Introduced in House (emphases added), http://bbanow.org/news/2011-01-
07/bba-introduced-congress (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
5 
If a balanced budget amendment were ratified, it would in all likelihood empower the 
courts to make appropriate remedial orders for any violation of the newly enacted provision.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court jealously guards its authority to interpret the Constitution and to 
provide remedy for its violation.
18
  This is not a recent development, but one that extends back to 
Marbury v. Madison and Chief Justice Marshall’s famous declaration that “it is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”19  Perversely, many 
supporters of the balanced budget amendment have criticized the judiciary’s lack of self-restraint 
in interpreting the Constitution in other contexts.  Why, then, would they expect reticence and 
restraint with respect to a balanced budget amendment? 
If the courts were to play their usual role as constitutional interpreter and enforcer with 
respect to the balanced budget amendment, however, it would threaten not merely to alter but to 
eviscerate the fundamental character of the judiciary.  Our judiciary is able to perform its 
function because it is independent of politics, and because the public trusts that independence.  
This character stems from the Constitution’s specific design.20  Federal judges do not depend on 
politics to maintain office and do not participate in the political functions of government.  In 
advocating for the Constitution’s ratification, Alexander Hamilton wrote, in The Federalist No. 
78, that “The judiciary [has] no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either 
of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.  It may 
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”21  The Constitution’s 
framers understood that the judicial role was to decide cases according to law and completely 
independent of political considerations or influence. 
Our independent federal judiciary is highly skilled at deciding legal questions.  It is not at 
all competent to make decisions of a political or policy nature.  Judges are not, generally 
speaking, trained in matters of economics or finance.  They have no special competency that 
would recommend committing such decisions to them.  Moreover, the processes of litigation are 
not well adapted to resolving disputes over sound economic policy.  Judges can hear and weigh 
evidence from witnesses, witnesses who are chosen and called by the parties and not by the 
judge.  But they do not hold hearings of a legislative sort.  Legislators can call any witness they 
like and ask whatever questions they like.  Legislative hearings allow the legislature to call all 
interested parties, not just the parties to a lawsuit, and allow legislators to pursue any line of 
inquiry they believe to be worthwhile.  Finally, legislators are politically accountable for their 
decisions.  Judges are not and should not be.  Decisions regarding how to achieve a balanced 
budget are precisely the type of decisions that involve will and not judgment, to use Hamilton’s 
phrase, and so should be made by accountable officials rather than judges. 
If the balanced budget amendment were ratified and Congress were to fail to enact a 
balanced budget, the judiciary would be pressed into declaring the constitutional violation.  In a 
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 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
19
 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
20
 The Constitution allows judges to retain office during “good behavior,” which effectively guarantees life tenure 
subject to removal through impeachment and conviction.  The Constitution further secures the independence of the 
judiciary by forbidding their compensation to be reduced.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
21




 for relief, however, there would be no way of ordering a remedy without 
making decisions that would be inextricably political.  Such a decision inevitably would involve 
a judgment about tradeoffs between spending reduction and revenue raising and, within each of 
these categories, between types of spending reductions (national defense spending or entitlement 
spending, for example) and between types of revenue raising (income tax, capital gains tax, 
estate tax, etc.). 
For these reasons, one might expect the courts to regard questions raised regarding the 
balanced budget amendment to be non-justiciable political questions.  In fact, there is no reason 
to expect that this is the road the courts would follow.  Indeed, there is a consensus that the 
courts will become embroiled in controversies over balancing the budget.  As Judge Robert Bork 
declared in opposing a balanced budget constitutional amendment,, “[t]he result . . . would likely 
be hundreds, if not thousands, of lawsuits around the country, many of them on inconsistent 
theories and providing inconsistent results.”23  
Professor Charles Fried of Harvard Law School, has observed that neither the political 
question doctrine nor limitations on standing would necessarily preclude litigation that would 
ensnare the judiciary in the thicket of budgetary politics.
24
  To be sure, "the political question 
doctrine . . . is designed to restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business 
of the other branches of Government,"
25
 but many Supreme Court decisions indicate the Court is 
prepared (wisely or unwisely) to resolve questions that might once have been considered 
"political."  For example, in United States v. Munoz-Flores,
26
 the Court adjudicated a claim that 
an assessment was unconstitutional because Congress had failed to comply with the Origination 
Clause, which mandates that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives." U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.  The Court rejected the argument that this issue 
was a nonjusticiable political question.  And in 1992, the Court held that congressional selection 
of a method for apportionment of congressional elections is not a "political question" and is 
therefore subject to judicial review.
27
 
Following these cases, the Supreme Court decided a case, Clinton v. Jones, in which a 
sitting President was sued personally.  The Court did not see lawsuits involving a sitting 
President as inherently political and authorized a federal trial court to exercise jurisdiction over 
the claim and over the President personally.
28
  Most blatantly, the Supreme Court decided a case, 
Bush v. Gore, where the political nature of the question presented was evident from the caption 
itself.  In that case, of course, the Supreme Court actually decided the outcome of a presidential 
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 By “prospective suit,” I mean a suit brought before outlays actually exceed receipts. 
23
 See Bork, supra note 14, at 14, 18. 
24
 Balanced Budget Amendment -- S.J. Res. 41: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 103d Cong. 
82-83, 86-87 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Senate Hearings]. 
25
 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) 
("Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is . . . a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government."). 
26
 495 U.S. 385 (1990). 
27
 Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992). 
28





The judiciary has not shied away from disputes over the budget or the budgeting process.  
The Supreme Court struck down Congress’s first attempt to impose a structure that would yield a 
balanced budget – the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.30  It has also struck down the so-called 
Line Item Veto Act.
31
  The Court also heard a case involving President Richard Nixon’s 
assertion of constitutional authority to impound funds.
32
  Lastly, some of the legislative history 
surrounding previous versions of the balanced budget amendment suggests that at least limited 
judicial review is contemplated.  In light of this background, it is doubtful that courts would 
refuse to hear balanced budget claims on political question grounds.
33
 
In the end, there is a range of views as to the extent to which courts would involve 
themselves in issues arising under the balanced budget amendment. Judge Bork believes that 
there "would likely be hundreds, if not thousands, of lawsuits around the country" challenging 
various aspects of the amendment.
34
 Similarly, the late Professor Archibald Cox of Harvard Law 
School predicted that "there is a substantial chance, even a strong probability, that . . . federal 
courts all over the country would be drawn into its interpretation and enforcement,"
35
 and 
Professor Charles Fried has testified that "the amendment would surely precipitate us into subtle 
and intricate legal questions, and the litigation that would ensue would be gruesome, intrusive, 
and not at all edifying."
36
  Other commentators, such as former Attorney General William Barr, 
believe that the political question and standing doctrines likely would persuade courts to 
intervene in relatively few situations, and that there will not be an "avalanche" of litigation, but 
that, "[w]here the judicial power can properly be invoked, it will most likely be reserved to 
address serious and clearcut violations." 
Former Attorney General Barr may well be right that courts would be reluctant to get 
involved in most balanced budget cases -- and it would be proper for them to be so reluctant. 
However, none of the commentators, including former Attorney General Barr himself, believes 
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 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  For a discussion of the justiciability of the case, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was 
Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001). 
30
 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
31
 Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
32
 Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (holding that the president must spend funds if a statute requires that they 
be spent). 
33
 It might also be thought that the requirement that a plaintiff have standing could serve as a barrier to litigation 
involving the balanced budget amendment.  This is doubtful as well.  See The Balanced Budget Amendment: 
Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Walter E. Dellinger), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/jtecon.95.8.htm#N_26_. Since that testimony, the Court has narrowed both congressional 
standing, see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), and taxpayer standing, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 
551 U.S. 587 (2007).  The Court has not, however, closed off these bases of standing entirely.  The Court, for 
example, quite emphatically refused to abolish the doctrine of taxpayer standing in Hein.  See id. (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  Aside from these specialized categories of potential plaintiffs, any party who is adversely affected by 
government spending in excess of revenues would appear to suffer an injury-in-fact for standing purposes and so 
would have a strong claim to hold standing to litigate. 
34
 See Bork, supra note 14, at 14, 18. 
35
 1994 Senate Hearings, at 157 (statement of Archibald Cox, Professor of Law, Harvard University). 
36
 Id. at 83 (testimony of Charles Fried, Professor of Law, Harvard University). 
8 
that the amendment would bar courts from at least occasional intrusion into the budget process.
37
  
Accordingly, whether we would face an "avalanche" of litigation or fewer cases alleging "serious 
and clearcut violations," there is a consensus that the amendment creates the potential for the 
involvement of courts in issues arising under the balanced budget amendment, and that while 
judicial review of alleged constitutional violations is appropriate, judicial resolution of budget 
disputes is not.  In the end, it matters little whether the number of cases brought under a balanced 
budget amendment would be large or small.  A single case could easily represent an avalanche of 
litigation in terms of its far-reaching consequences.   
There is also a set of cases, unnoticed in previous commentary on balanced budget 
amendment proposals, over which the Court would seem to have undeniable authority to exercise 
review.  Prior commentary has considered litigation brought at a time when a budget is passed 
but before it has actually taken effect and so before outlays have actually exceeded receipts.  In 
this setting, as discussed above, there are very significant problems relating to the sort of 
prospective remedy a court might order and to what parties might satisfy the constitutional and 
prudential requirements of standing.  None of these problems is present if the litigation is 
brought after the fiscal year’s receipts have been exhausted.  If outlays exceed receipts for a 
given year, the federal government would be in violation of the balanced budget amendment for 
every expenditure it makes from that point through the end of the fiscal year.  The Constitution 
already contains a separate provision that would render such spending illegal:  “no money shall 
be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”38  The balanced 
budget amendment would establish the invalidity of any outlay, or appropriation of funds, in 
excess of receipts, and therefore such an appropriation would not be “made by law.” 
A single lawsuit could be sufficient to have government operations declared invalid once 
the year’s revenues have been exhausted and this, in turn, could require the entire federal 
government to shut down, because everything the federal government does involves an 
expenditure of funds to pay the official or officials that undertake the government action.  Thus, 
for example, any individual who is subject to a criminal prosecution on the day after federal 
receipts have been exhausted would have standing to assert that the prosecutor is illegally in 
court, because his salary for that day represents an outlay in excess of receipts.  Or, a coal mine 
operator who is subject to a mine safety inspection could seek an injunction to prohibit federal 
officials from carrying out the inspection on the same grounds. 
While a prospective suit would raise serious concerns with respect to remedy, requiring 
federal judges to determine which spending to cut or how to raise revenues, a lawsuit brought 
after federal outlays exceed receipts would not.  For such a suit, the remedy would be quite 
simple and judicially manageable:  an order prohibiting further outlays.  This remedy is 
judicially manageable in that it does not require a judge to make any inappropriate determination 
of economic policy, but the consequences of such a remedy would be catastrophic.  This remedy 
would require a complete government shutdown, unlike the much more limited statutory 
                                                 
37
 Attorney General Barr has stated that “I would be the last to say that the standing doctrine is an ironclad shield 
against judicial activism. The doctrine is malleable and it has been manipulated by the courts in the past.” The 
Balanced-Budget Amendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 126 
(1996) (statement of former Attorney General William Barr). 
38
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
9 
shutdowns that have occurred from time to time.
39
 
There are several illuminating distinctions between a constitutionally compelled complete 
shutdown and a statutory shutdown.  First, unlike a statutory shutdown, Congress could not solve 
the problem through the simple expedient of passing a continuing resolution.  Congress would 
have to actually raise the revenue to pay for the continuance of federal operations.  Second, the 
relevant statutes have been interpreted to allow for exceptions where the obligation of funds in 
advance of an appropriation is necessary to protect life or property and in other “emergency” 
situations.
40
  The balanced budget amendment contains no such exceptions
41
 and thus, on its 
face, could require the federal government to cease all operations, including the operation of 
federal prisons, air traffic control facilities, food and workplace safety inspections, border 
control, military operations, and other critical functions.
42
 
There would be an alternative judicial route to enforcing compliance with the balanced 
budget amendment: federal courts might impose taxes or other revenue raising measures to fund 
the continuing operations of the federal government.  In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court 
held that a federal district court could mandate that a state increase taxes in order to fund a 
school desegregation program.  This would avoid the seriously harmful consequences of 
requiring a cessation of federal operations, but at the expense of the judiciary taking on a role 
that, in our constitutional system, is properly assigned to the politically accountable branches. 
Thus, once federal expenditures equal federal revenues in a given year, a small number of 
cases or even a single lawsuit would do lasting damage to the judiciary and to our constitutional 
structure.  To put it differently, a single case could represent an avalanche of litigation.  And, 
should it turn out that courts do not become involved, we would be faced with the prospect of an 
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 I refer to these as statutory government shutdowns because the requirement that the government cease operations 
and the scope of the cessation are defined by statute, particularly the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 
(2006). 
40
 See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alice Rivlin, Dir., 
Office of Mgmt. and Budget (Aug. 16, 1995), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/memoranda/m95-18.pdf; Applicability of the 
Antideficiency Act Upon A Lapse in an Agency's Appropriations, 4A Op. O.L.C. 16 (1980). 
41
 It is true that many proposals, such as H.J. Res. 2, include an exception for times when the nation is at war or is 
engaged in military conflict.  But none of the leading proposals includes an exception for emergencies generally.  
Presumably, this is because such an exception could be made to render the amendment meaningless, since Congress 
would then be free to declare an emergency whenever it lacks the political will to balance the budget.  While 
understandable, the result is that the amendment, if ratified, would not allow deficit spending for such non-military 
emergencies as the need to keep federal prisons or air traffic control systems operating. 
42
 It is possible that, under the guise of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court would create exceptions to 
make the balanced budget amendment workable and to avoid the serious dislocation that would attend a literal 
application of its terms.  I am not confident that the Court would do so.  The Court has been willing, for example, to 
accept dramatic dislocation of the criminal justice system as the consequence of the literal application of other 
constitutional guarantees.  See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  In another instance, the Supreme 
Court ruled the entire system of federal bankruptcy courts to be constitutionally defective.  Northern Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  The Court employed its equitable powers to toll the 
effective date of its ruling and give Congress time comply with its ruling.  Since that case, the Court has disavowed 
such an exercise of equitable power and ruled that its constitutional decisions must be applied retroactively.  See 
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Revenue, 509 U.S. 86 (1993).  Even if the Court were to accept the invitation to eviscerate 
the balanced budget amendment through interpretation, it is difficult to see how this counts in the amendment’s 
favor.  If we are not serious about forcing compliance with the amendment, why pass it in the first place?  
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amendment that includes no enforcement mechanism, and of constitutional violations for which 
there is no judicial remedy. As discussed below, this prospect also would be deeply troubling. 
B. Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms Offer No Solution 
1. Executive Enforcement 
It is possible that, in the alternative, the power to enforce balance in the federal budget 
would devolve upon the president.
43
  The president could plausibly
44
 interpret the constitutional 
command of the balanced budget amendment that expenditures not exceed revenues to take 
precedence over mere statutes, including appropriations bills, entitlement packages, and the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
45
  Although the president might 
interpret that command to authorize him to impound funds, nothing in the amendment would 
guide the exercise of such a power.  For example, the proposal does not say whether the 
President may select particular areas of his choosing for impoundment, or whether certain areas -
- such as Social Security and other entitlement programs -- would be beyond the purview of his 
impoundment authority.  Under this potentiality, it would be up to the President and the 
President alone to make fundamentally important policy choices about what spending should 
continue and what spending should be cut.  This prospect is in deep tension with the existing 
Constitution.  The framers assigned the power of the purse in no uncertain terms to Congress.  
This was an intentional decision.  In our constitutional system, Congress is most directly 
accountable to the public.
46
  Moreover, Congress is structured in a way that facilitates debate and 
deliberation, allows for a wide range of interests and viewpoints to be heard, and permits the 
public to follow and participate in the deliberation.
47
  The President and the executive cabinet are 
not similarly constructed and are, in fact, designed to operate with greater dispatch and secrecy.  
Those who wrote and ratified our Constitution thought that decisions about how to fund the 
operations of the government and what operations to continue funding were the sort of decisions 
that should be committed to the open and deliberate process of the legislative branch rather than 
                                                 
43
 I do not mean to suggest that this would be the best reading of the balanced budget amendment. 
44
 Such an interpretation would be plausible not only because the Constitution vests the President with the executive 
power, but also because it imposes on the President the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.  This duty includes the obligation that the President take care that the Constitution be 
faithfully executed.  See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally 
Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000); CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE 
OF “UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS:  REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE (1998). 
45
 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-692 (2006). 
46
 Congress’s direct popular election stands in contrast to the President’s, which is mediated through the Electoral 
College.  Moreover, the House of Representatives stands for election every two years, leaving it most closely 
connected to current public sentiment.  It is for this very reason that the Constitution requires that all bills for raising 
revenue originate in the House of Representatives. 
47
 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (securing the right to petition); id. art. I, § 5 (authorizing Congress to establish its 
own internal structures and anticipating that these would foster deliberation through mechanisms such as the 
committee structure and, in the Senate, the filibuster); id. (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and 
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas 
and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be 
entered on the Journal.”). 
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closed and unitary action of the executive.  To reassign this power to the President would 
represent a fundamental break with the original design of the Constitution.
48
 
The assignment of this power to the President would undermine the Constitution’s 
structure in an additional way.  It would upset the balance of power between the President and 
Congress.  The framers of the Constitution understood that allocating the power of the purse to 
Congress would serve to make it “the most dangerous branch.”49  Indeed, the framers thought it 
inevitable that, in a representative republic, the legislative branch would predominate.  To check 
against the potential for abuse of its relatively vast powers, the Constitution imposes a range of 
internal checks on Congress, such as dividing the legislature into two chambers of notably 
different character.  There are no corresponding internal checks on the operations of the 
executive branch.  Thus, the reallocation of Congress’s power of the purse to the President would 
significantly alter the balance of power between Congress and the President and would leave that 
power unconstrained by the constitutional structures that promote deliberation and that deter 
Congress from exercising its powers oppressively.  Uniting these powers to formulate fiscal 
policy and to then enforce that policy in the hands of the President alone would represent what 




2. Independent Enforcement 
Given that either judicial or executive enforcement of the balanced budget amendment 
would subvert our constitutional framework and possibly lead to substantial practical harm, it 
might be tempting to revise the amendment to provide for enforcement by an independent 
agency on the model of the Federal Reserve.  Such a model would not only repeat but exacerbate 
the problems that inhere in executive enforcement.  Because an independent agency is, by 
definition and design, insulated from political accountability, the fundamental fiscal policy 
choices involved in balancing the budget would be even more effectively removed from public 
input and accountability.  The insulation of monetary policy, which the Federal Reserve 
presently sets, from immediate political control and accountability can be justified by the 
peculiar dangers of allowing political manipulation of the money supply.  Whatever the merits of 
this justification with respect to monetary policy,
 51
 it does not apply to fiscal policy. 
3. No Enforcement:  The Balanced Budget Amendment as Empty Platitude 
In the absence of enforcement mechanisms such as presidential impoundment of funds or 
judicial involvement in the budgeting process, a balanced budget amendment is unlikely to bring 
about a balanced budget.  To have the Constitution declare that the budget shall be balanced, 
                                                 
48
 This argument derives from the position of the Department of Justice set forth by then-Assistant Attorney General 
Walter Dellinger.  See The Balanced Budget Amendment: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, 104th 
Cong. (1995) (statement of Walter E. Dellinger), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/jtecon.95.8.htm#N_26_. 
49
 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).  Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 
(1819) (“the power to tax involves the power to destroy”). 
50
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (uniting the power of one branch with the power of another “may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
51
 This judgment finds affirmation from the nearly universal practice of economically developed democracies in 
committing decisions over monetary policy to independent central banks.  
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while providing no mechanism to make that happen, would place an empty promise in the 
fundamental charter of our government and lead to countless constitutional violations.  
Moreover, to have a provision of the Constitution routinely violated would inevitably make all 
other provisions of the Constitution seem far less inviolable.  As Alexander Hamilton noted: 
Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government 
with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that 
every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by 
necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be 
maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a 
country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same 




Some have suggested that even if the amendment failed to eliminate the deficit, it would 
nonetheless have the salutary effect of creating pressure to reduce the deficit.  While this might 
be true, the effect would come at considerable cost.  Even supposing that the amendment brought 
about a reduction in the size of the deficit, the remaining excess of expenditures over receipts 
would constitute a continuing multi-billion-dollar violation of the Constitution, every day that 
the budget is not in balance.  For how long would we as a people continue to make difficult 
decisions to comply with the First Amendment or with the Due Process or Takings Clauses of 
the Fifth Amendment if we had routinely failed, for lack of an enforcement mechanism, to come 
within billions of dollars of complying with the most recent amendment to our Constitution? 
If only we could declare by constitutional amendment that from this day forward justice 
would prevail and sound economic policy would be followed.  But merely saying those things in 
the Constitution does not make them happen.  As nations around the world have discovered, 
placing a statement of principle in a constitution does not mean the principle will be obeyed.  
Many constitutions "guarantee" a clean environment or freedom from poverty; the only effect 
when such promises fail is that the constitution is not taken seriously as positive law, the kind of 
law that may be invoked in court by litigants.  The framers of our Constitution, on the contrary, 
understood that its provisions must be enforceable if the rule of law is to be respected.  We 
                                                 
52
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 167 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For further expression of this 
concern, as it relates to proposed balanced budget amendments quite similar to this one, see, e.g., Peter W. Rodino, 
The Proposed Balanced Budget/Tax Limitation Constitutional Amendment: No Balance, No Limits, 10 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 785, 800 (1983); Proposed Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendments: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.  614-15 (1989) 
(letter from William Van Alstyne, Professor of Law, Duke University to Warren Grimes, Counsel, House Judiciary 
Committee); id. (letter from Jonathan Varrat, Professor of Law, U.C.L.A. to the Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr., 
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee); and Constitutional Amendments to Balance the Federal Budget: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 22 (1980) 
(testimony of Paul A. Samuelson, Nobel-prize-winning economist) ("If the adopted amendment provides escape 
valves so easy to invoke that the harm of the amendment can be avoided, the amendment degenerates into little more 
than a pious resolution, a rhetorical appendage to clutter up our magnificent historical Constitution. . . . There is no 
substitute for disciplined and informed choice by a democratic people of their basic economic policies."). 
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should hesitate long before placing an unenforceable promise in the fundamental document that 




A balanced budget amendment would threaten to tear irrevocably the fabric of our 
constitutional structure.  First, amending the Constitution to require a balanced budget would be 
a unique and dangerous experiment.  It is fundamentally inconsistent with the bedrock 
constitutional value of democratic self-government.  A balanced budget amendment would be 
the only constitutional provision, other than the failed attempt to mandate prohibition, that 
dictates the outcome of a policy dispute rather than governing the process by which decisions are 
made or protecting individual rights. 
Second, as a practical matter, enforcing a balanced budget amendment would have 
catastrophic consequences.  Previous commentary on balanced budget amendment proposals has 
focused on whether the courts would find the failure to enact a budget that is balanced to present 
the sort of controversy that judges can resolve.  There appears to be a broad consensus that in at 
least some, and perhaps in many, instances, judges would resolve balanced budget controversies.  
In such instances, this would mean judges would be required to order either spending cuts or tax 
increases.  This prospect is so troubling that it has justly alarmed commentators across the 
political spectrum. 
In this Issue Brief, I have identified an additional type of lawsuit – one brought not 
before, but rather, after the year’s outlays exceed receipts – where there can be no question that 
the courts would have authority to make a ruling and where there would be no issue as to what 
the proper remedy would be.  In this setting, a balanced budget amendment operating in tandem 
with the Appropriations Clause would compel all government functions to cease immediately 
and for the remainder of the fiscal year.  There is no hyperbole in calling this result catastrophic.  
It would mean that the balanced budget requirement would force the federal government to close 
prisons, to stop air traffic control, to end border patrol and other national security enforcement, to 
withdraw criminal prosecutions, to abandon all military activities not involving actual conflict or 
the prosecution of a declared war, to close Veterans Administration hospitals, and to withhold 
Social Security payments.  These, of course, are only a few examples of what a balanced budget 
amendment would inflict on the nation. 
In light of these dramatic consequences, attention has understandably shifted to the 
possibility of alternatives.  As shown above, there are no viable options.  If the power to enforce 
the requirement of balance were vested in the President, it would undo the constitutional 
separation of powers.  The Constitution quite intentionally located the power of the purse in 
Congress.  To join that power with the executive power would create the very threat of tyranny 
the framers specifically designed the Constitution to safeguard against.  Allocating enforcement 
power to an independent agency modeled on the Federal Reserve would only heighten this 
threat. 
                                                 
53
 This argument also derives from the position of the Department of Justice.  See The Balanced Budget Amendment: 
Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Walter E. Dellinger), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/jtecon.95.8.htm#N_26_. 
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Finally, it may be tempting to treat a balanced budget amendment as a symbolic and 
aspirational statement that is not legally enforceable; that, indeed, is not law at all.  This is 
clearly not how the advocates of an amendment see it.  Moreover, even a purely hortatory 
declaration would be far from harmless.  There is no reason to expect that Congress, even a 
Congress composed of members in good faith committed to the principle of a balanced budget, 
would agree on how to balance the budget.  The result would be an open and notorious 
constitutional violation.  This would undermine in previously unknown ways the binding force of 
the Constitution’s otherwise binding legal norms.  I do not mean to suggest that this would lead 
straightaway to anarchy, but it would almost certainly water down the force of other 
constitutional guarantees.  Over time this erosion could leave some constitutional provisions as 
empty as the illusory promise of a balanced budget. 
The threat a balanced budget amendment would pose to our constitutional order is 
unavoidable.  Congress, of course, remains free to enact a balanced budget if it believes this is 
sound economic policy.  It also remains fully equipped to institute effective controls to ensure 
restraint and balance in the budgeting process.  Therefore, there is no sufficient reason to incur 
the dramatic risks that the balanced budget amendment would entail for our Constitution and our 
nation. 
